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ABSTRACT
Prior literature’s inability to document an empirical relation between non-audit service
fees and compromised auditor independence contradicts the significant and long-standing
concerns expressed by regulators and the investing community. The purpose of this paper is to
reconcile the lack of findings in prior research with regulators’ and investors’ concerns about
non-audit services. Using a new measure – goodwill impairments – that alleviates many of the
potential limitations that could have prevented prior research from documenting evidence to
support the proposed relation between non-audit services and auditor independence, I find that
the level of non-audit fees of a client is negatively associated with the likelihood of recording a
goodwill impairment in settings where the market indicates goodwill may be impaired. Further
examinations of these findings suggest that the lack of results in prior literature could be related
to limitations in the settings being tested in those papers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Independence is the foundation of the benefits that investors derive from external
auditors. Any weakening of this independence reduces the value of information provided by the
auditor to the capital markets. The potential for diminished independence in the auditor-client
relationship, specifically in the presence of significant non-audit service fees, has long been a
concern of regulators and other users of financial statements.1 By the early 2000’s, concerns had
elevated to the point that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took significant
steps to combat potential independence fears by implementing multiple restrictions on the types
of non-audit services the auditor can provide to their audit clients. These restrictions include
services such as bookkeeping, financial information systems design, and appraisal or valuation
services.2 The SEC also ensured audit committee involvement in the purchase of non-audit
services by requiring the committee to pre-approve those additional services (SEC 2002b).
Although regulators have taken some action in an attempt to ensure auditors remain independent,
research has generally found little consistent evidence to confirm the existence of a detrimental
impact of non-audit services on auditor independence (Blay and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al.
2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009). This lack of evidence also contradicts a related stream
of literature that indicates investors are also concerned about companies’ purchases of non-audit
services from their external auditor (Higgs and Skantz 2006; Khurana and Raman 2006;
Krishnan et al. 2005). The inconsistency between these two streams of literature seems to go

1

Throughout the paper, any discussion of non-audit services and/or the related fees for those services refers to
additional non-audit services purchased from the company’s current external auditor. The fees are as classified by
Audit Analytics and follow both classification guidelines from the SEC and prior literature in this area.
2
Although several non-audit services were restricted, an extensive list of permissible non-audit services remains.
This list includes services such as benefit plan audits, assistance related to mergers and acquisitions, attestation
services, accounting consultations, tax compliance, tax planning, tax advice, and operational audits.
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against conventional markets wisdom. Why are investors concerned about something that seems
to have little or no bearing on their investments?
There are two possible explanations for prior research’s failure to find consistent
evidence that non-audit service fees impair auditor independence. It is certainly possible that the
lack of results is an accurate reflection of the fact that non-audit fees do not actually impair
independence. However, it is also possible that certain limitations in the approaches used in these
prior studies prevented them from finding evidence of the relation between non-audit fees and
independence, even though such a relation exists. The purpose of this paper is to improve our
ability to interpret the reasons for prior research’s lack of evidence by employing a new measure
– goodwill impairments – that is not subject to many of the limitations of prior research.
A primary issue found in prior literature is that it is difficult to use financial statement
outputs to infer independence compromises. The problem arises because one must be able to
determine what the measure ‘would have been’ if independence were not compromised in order
to determine if it changed in response to an independence compromise. Several measures used in
prior research on non-audit fees, such as restatements and discretionary accruals, suffer from this
sample construction issue. A primary benefit to examining goodwill impairments is that capital
markets can be used to create an appropriate sample of companies with a high probability of
having their goodwill impaired, as a market-to-book ratio less than one suggests that something
on the books is overvalued (Beatty and Weber 2006; Churyk 2005; Harrington et al. 2012).
While going concerns are often used in an attempt to alleviate the aforementioned
‘counterfactual’ observations concern (i.e. researchers create a sample of distressed companies),
they still suffer some from this issue and several others. A primary benefit that impairments offer
over going concerns is that impairments occur across a broad spectrum of the corporate
2

population. Going concerns, on the other hand, are limited in their occurrences, which could
result in a lack of power in testing. Additionally, the use of going concerns introduces several
potential biases against finding any results. One concern is that auditors may simply be unwilling
to weaken their independence for a company in which they have substantial concerns about
future viability. Furthermore, going concern reporting can have strong legal liability
implications. Even if auditors are not concerned about future viability, they may be concerned
about litigation arising if a going concern is not properly issued. Unlike going concerns, goodwill
impairments occur over a wide range of companies and settings and should be generally less
susceptible to these potential biases.
Prior to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 142 (SFAS 142), goodwill
accounting was fairly straightforward. It required little involvement from the auditor and,
consequently, was relatively useless as a testing measure for audit related questions. The passage
of SFAS 142, however, dramatically changed the process of accounting for goodwill. It brought
about the end of the goodwill amortization era and the beginning of annual impairment testing.
The introduction of ongoing impairment monitoring significantly changed the role of the auditor
relating to goodwill. The auditor must now devote significant time to the testing of this balance,
ensuring that management has properly assessed and, if necessary, written down goodwill.
Significant auditor involvement in this area requiring subjective judgments could present the
opportunity for an auditor to be influenced by their financial ties to a client. The combination of
subjective judgments, competing auditor-client incentives, and significant auditor consequences,
along with the potential alleviation of prior research limitations, suggests goodwill impairments
may provide a better setting for testing the impact of non-audit fees on auditor independence.

3

To test for the weakening of auditor independence in the presence of non-audit fees, I
employ a sample of 3,615 firms with a material level of goodwill and a market-to-book ratio less
than one.3 Having a material level of goodwill ensures that there is the potential for a material
goodwill impairment. The market-to-book threshold provides a situation in which the market has
signaled that something on the books is over-valued, creating a setting with a more appropriate
group of observations for testing auditor independence. Using this sample, I examine whether the
existing auditor’s propensity to require an impairment write-down of goodwill is associated with
the level of non-audit services provided to that audit client. The findings of this analysis suggest
that the level of non-audit fees of a client reduces the likelihood of impairment in settings where
the market indicates goodwill may be impaired. Further examinations of these findings suggest
that the lack of results in prior literature could be related to limitations in the setting being tested.
Additional analyses provide further support for the finding of a negative relation between
non-audit fees and goodwill impairments. The first additional test measures the impact that nonaudit fees have on the amount of a goodwill impairment taken. This analysis offer insights into
whether clients that have a larger influence on their auditor through a higher level of non-audit
fees may receive preferential treatment in the relative amount of impairment. The results of these
tests suggest that clients who pay higher amounts of non-audit fees do impair lower amounts
relative to other clients. A second additional analysis measures whether non-audit fees have an
impact on the timeliness of goodwill impairments. This analysis provides evidence as to whether

3

Materiality is defined as 0.5 percent of revenues. I employ this materiality threshold to focus on only those
impairment transactions most likely to be of consequence to a company. This cut-off is in line with survey responses
from eight of the nine largest U.S. audit firms: BDO USA, LLP; Crowe Horwath LLP; Deloitte & Touche LLP;
Ernst & Young LLP; Grant Thornton LLP; KPMG LLP; McGladrey LLP; and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
(Eilifsen and Messier Jr. 2013). I test the sensitivity of this threshold in the additional analyses and robustness
section of the paper.
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clients who buy greater amounts of non-audit services are allowed a delay in recording an
impairment. Findings indicate that these clients do in fact take longer to impair their goodwill.
Taken together with the results from the main analysis, these findings suggest that non-audit
service fees have a significant and negative relation with goodwill impairments.
This paper provides a significant contribution to the existing independence literature by
helping to reconcile the concerns of investors and regulations with the lack of findings in prior
independence literature. Specifically, I employ a new measure to alleviate several possible
research limitations occurring in prior research. Differing from most prior studies, the results
using this measure suggest that auditors receiving higher levels of non-audit fees may behave in
a less independent manner. This reduction in independence is evidenced through the significant
and negative relation between non-audit fees and the likelihood, amount, and timeliness of
goodwill impairments. Further, analyses provide some evidence that the lack of results found in
prior studies may have been due to limitations in the sample of data being employed. Taken
together, these findings offer some reconciliation between the documented investor concerns and
the lack of evidence indicating any actual impairment of independence and suggest that the
understanding of that relation may be less complete than previously thought.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
background information and hypothesis development. The proposed research design and sample
selection process are outlined in Section III. Results are discussed in Section IV and Section V
considers the potential sample limitations of prior research. Section VI presents several
additional analyses and robustness checks. Concluding remarks are presented in Section VI.

5

II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
As discussed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the purpose of an audit
is to provide the public with “additional assurance — beyond managements' own assertions —
that a company's financial statements can be relied upon” (SEC 2002a). During this discussion,
they also cite the following statement from the U.S. Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Arthur
Young: "The SEC requires the filing of audited financial statements in order to obviate the fear
of loss from reliance on inaccurate information, thereby encouraging public investment in the
Nation's industries." The independence that exists between auditors and their clients is
paramount as it has important implications for investors, banks and financial institutions, and
other parties that may transact with a company. If an auditor’s independence were to be
compromised, it could have sizeable effects on financial decisions and capital allocation within
the market. Echoing this sentiment in a statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Securities,
Insurance and Investment, the former Chief Accountant of the SEC, Lynn Turner, stated:
“[Auditors] have an extremely important role as a gatekeeper to the capital
markets both in the United States as well as abroad. Independent audits provide
investors with reasonable assurance – that is high but not absolute assurance – the
financial statements are correct and complete within the boundaries of materiality.
It is the objectivity – the independence – of the auditor that creates the value of an
audit. Without that independence and objectivity, an audit has no value. As the
increasing complexity of business transactions, products and structures result in
more subjective accounting standards, they also continue to create the need for
judgment on the part of auditors. Subjective, very judgmental decisions by the
auditor also greatly enhance the need for objectivity and professional skepticism
on the part of auditors.” (Turner 2011)
While this discussion highlights some of the reasons why auditor independence is
extremely important, it is also necessary to understand what may impair this independence.
DeAngelo (1981) defines auditor independence as “the conditional probability of reporting a
discovered breach” in the clients accounting system and suggests that it is one of the two critical
6

components of audit quality. She argues that the “incumbent auditors have some incentive to
lower quality opportunistically in order to retain the client in future periods. This incentive
occurs because clients can impose real costs on auditors by termination (loss of the wealth
equivalent of the client-specific quasi-rent stream). Therefore clients can potentially extract
accounting concessions from incumbent auditors by a credible threat of termination.” The
incentive to compromise independence could be particularly strong for clients with a large
amount of highly profitable non-audit service fees.
Furthering the concerns expressed by DeAngelo (1981) is the long-standing concern that
auditors collecting fees directly from clients advances the potential for independence deviations.
These concerns, among others, led the SEC to direct companies to disclose the amount and types
of fees paid to their auditor – a disclosure process that went into effect on February 5, 2001 (SEC
2001). Beyond fee disclosure, the SEC also introduced requirements as part of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX) that limited the types of non-audit services that could be performed
and took action to ensure that the audit committee would be involved in the process of
purchasing any non-audit services (SEC 2002b).4
In response to regulators’ concerns and the related changes introduced, several academics
have examined the relation between non-audit fees and auditor independence. Studies in this area
have included investor responses as well as direct attempts at finding instances of independence

4

These requirements prohibit an auditor from “contemporaneously” providing a public company auditing client
with the following specific types of consulting or other non-audit services: bookkeeping or other services related to
the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; financial information systems design and
implementation; appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial services;
internal audit outsourcing services; management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser,
or investment banking services; legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; any other service that the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible.
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concerns using proxies for failed audits.5 Prior literature investigating investor response has
documented several instances of concern about non-audit fees. Testing investor perception,
Krishnan et al. (2005) investigate the association between fee-based measures of non-audit
service purchases and earnings response coefficients (ERCs). They find that the non-audit fee
ratio and the level of non-audit fees were negatively associated with ERCs. Higgs and Skantz
(2006) also use ERCs to assess investor perception of fees. For audit fees, the authors find
evidence consistent with the market interpreting abnormally high audit fees as a signal of high
earnings quality. When analyzing non-audit fees, however, the authors find evidence that
abnormally high non-audit fees impair perceived auditor independence. Further testing investor
perception of non-audit fees, Khurana and Raman (2006) employ the client-specific ex ante cost
of equity capital as a proxy for investor perceptions of financial reporting credibility. They find
that the higher the non-audit fees paid to the auditor, the greater the implied threat to auditor
independence and the lower the financial reporting credibility of a Big 5 audit.6 Taken together,
these results provide evidence that investors perceive non-audit fees as a detriment to auditor
independence.
While the concerns expressed by investors suggest non-audit fees are problematic, studies
have failed to find much consistent evidence of auditors actually impairing their independence

5
Proxies commonly include issuance of a going concern, restatements, and discretionary accruals. Measures such as
restatements and discretionary accruals, however, generally lack a definable group of counter factual observations in
which to properly test the independence portion of overall audit quality. As a result, these other measures have
generally provided little consistent support for the idea that auditors impair their independence (Frankel et al. 2002;
Jong-Hag et al. 2010; Kinney Jr et al. 2004; Krishnan et al. 2011; Paterson and Valencia 2011; Reynolds et al.
2004).
6
Other parties have also expressed concerns. Schmidt (2012) finds that when plaintiff attorneys argue that auditor
independence was impaired due to dependence on non-audit fees, restatement-related audit litigation is more likely
to result in an auditor settlement and a larger amount of settlement. She concludes that audit litigants act as if they
believe non-audit fees will strengthen the case against the auditor.
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(Callaghan et al. 2009; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009).7 This general lack
of evidence was highlighted by Francis (2006) when he commented on the overall findings from
the non-audit services (NAS) line of research, stating that there is “a growing body of empirical
evidence that questions whether there is any logical rationale for restricting the scope of the
services that auditors provide to their audit clients. In reviewing the NAS research literature over
the past 40 years, one has to conclude that there is no ‘smoking gun’ evidence linking the
provision of non-audit services with audit failures.” More recent findings from Blay and Geiger
(2013), however, suggest that some apprehension may be warranted. Studying behavior in the
post-SOX era, they find some evidence that a higher level of concurrent non-audit fees is
associated with a lower propensity to issue a going concern modification. Blay and Geiger
(2013) note, however, that their “findings related to going concern decisions and NAS fees in the
United States are sensitive to both the time period examined and the selection of appropriate
control samples of distressed non-GCM firms.”
To date, going concerns have generally been thought to provide the best opportunity for
gaining insight on auditor independence. They offer a significant benefit from the perspective
that the going concern decision process is both under the control of the auditor and unobservable
to the public (Blay and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Reynolds and Francis 2000). While
that benefit is certainly of value, going concern modifications also have several limitations,
especially when compared with goodwill impairments. Testing independence using the
propensity to properly issue a going concern requires construction of a sample of companies that
“should have” received a going concern. This requires assumptions to be made about how to

7

While little consistent evidence has been obtained from studies in the United States, findings from other countries
have provided some support for the idea that non-audit fees impair auditor independence (Basioudis et al. 2008;
Firth 2002; Sharma and Sidhu 2001).
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properly define a financially distressed company. As highlighted in the findings of Blay and
Geiger (2013), these assumptions can lead to significant changes in results. By comparison, the
capital markets can help create a sample of likely goodwill impairments by using instances when
book value exceeds market value (Beatty and Weber 2006; Churyk 2005; Harrington et al.
2012).8 Additionally, going concerns modifications are received by only a small number of
companies, greatly reducing the power of any tests examining them. By definition, going
concerns are also constrained to the most distressed companies, companies that also tend to be
small in nature. A primary benefit of employing goodwill impairments to measure independence
is that impairments occur much more frequently and do so across a much broader spectrum of
the corporate population. Furthermore, going concerns are also given in situations where the
auditor has substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue for the next year. It is
unclear why an auditor would compromise their independence for a client that they believe has a
highly questionable future viability. While still a negative signal, goodwill impairment is not
indicative of impending failure of a company. Finally, going concerns have been shown to
generate potential legal liability (Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Kaplan and Williams 2013; Lys
and Watts 1994). This factor likely makes going concerns a highly sensitive area to auditors, an
attribute that may reduce the likelihood of a deviation in independence. Unlike going concerns,
goodwill impairments are not known to have an association with auditor related litigation.9

8

Generally speaking, if a company has something on their books that is over-valued and also has a material level of
goodwill, a goodwill impairment is a very likely first step to correcting the valuation difference. I employ this
threshold in an attempt to narrow down likely impairers and am not suggesting that all companies that do not impair
are operating outside of GAAP.
9
In addition, goodwill impairments, unlike going concerns, are not an all or nothing proposition. They offer an
opportunity to assess magnitude effects in addition to the prior studied issue/no issue situations. They also offer an
opportunity to measure a timing effect of when a goodwill impairment occurs. These additional characteristics are
further explored in additional analyses.
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While the prior discussion outlines some of the potential research benefits of using
goodwill impairments in testing auditor independence, it is critically important that goodwill
impairments also possess the necessary market and auditor consequences to have merit as a test
measure. Several papers have documented negative market consequence associated with
recording a goodwill impairment. Churyk (2005) reports that impairments are value relevant and
are impounded into stock prices by investors. Further, Bens et al. (2011) provide evidence that
unexpected impairments are associated with a negative investor reaction. Additionally,
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) find a significantly negative relation between goodwill write-offs and
the market value of firms in the United Kingdom suggesting that investors incorporate these
losses into their assessment of firm value. Finally, Li et al. (2011) find that after a firm
announces an impairment loss, analysts, as well as investors, revise their expectations of future
profitability.
In addition to these market consequences, many academics and practitioners believe that,
due to the judgment required, goodwill impairments are “likely to be manipulated” and used to
“manage financial reports opportunistically” (Ramanna and Watts 2012; Watts 2003). Prior
literature has documented instances of this occurring by highlighting how management uses
impairments to manage earnings. Beatty and Weber (2006) find that firms are less apt to write
down goodwill when the impairment may cause a debt covenant violation or a potential issue
with exchange listing requirements. They also find that firms with earnings-based bonus plans
and companies with CEOs that have been in the position for a relatively long period of time are
less likely to record a goodwill impairment. In addition, Ramanna and Watts (2012) find some
evidence that managers are influenced by concerns related to debt covenant violations, executive
compensation, and CEO reputation which can lead them to avoid goodwill write-offs even when
11

there are market indications that their company’s goodwill is impaired. Exploring the underlying
motivations managers have to delay goodwill write-offs, Muller et al. (2012) find that managers
use the time for their personal gain by selling shares in the two years prior to the announcement
of a goodwill write-off. These management actions highlight the importance of auditor
independence when testing goodwill for potential impairment. Higher levels of independence
should result in clearer auditor judgment and a related lower risk of goodwill being manipulated
by management.
From an audit perspective, the often-conflicting goals of managers and auditors suggest
that the goodwill impairment process can be one of tension in the auditor-client relationship. A
potential result of this tension is highlighted by Ayres et al. (2014), who document an increase in
auditor switching after a goodwill impairment has occurred. The presence of these significant
consequences suggests that auditor incentives in the goodwill impairment process could become
mixed. The previously highlighted benefits of examining goodwill impairments over other
measures, along with these substantial consequences to the auditor, suggest that goodwill
impairments are an ideal setting for testing auditor independence. By using goodwill
impairments to help alleviate the potential limitations of prior research, I evaluate the relation
between non-audit fees and auditor independence and test the following hypothesis (stated in
null form):
H1:

There is no relation between the level of non-audit fees paid by a client and
impairment to that client’s goodwill.

12

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SELECTION
3.1 Research Methodology
To test H1, I assess the effect of non-audit fees on the likelihood of goodwill impairment
by performing estimations of the following logistic regression model:
IMPit = β0 + β1 LN_NONAUDITit + βx CONTROLSit + IND_FE + YEAR_FE + εit

(1)

where i denotes firm, t denotes year, and:
IMP

LN_NONAUDIT
CONTROLS
IND_FE
YEAR_FE
ε

= 1 if firm recorded a material goodwill impairment
(defined as greater than 0.5 percent of revenue) during the
fiscal year, 0 otherwise.
= natural log of the sum of non-audit fees paid to current
fiscal year auditor.
= vector of control variables.
= industry fixed effects.
= year fixed effects.
= error term.

The dependent variable IMP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company recorded a
material goodwill impairment during the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Consistent with prior
research, the variable of interest in this model is the natural log of non-audit fees
(LN_NONAUDIT) (Blay and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009).
As described in Section II, H1 tests whether the level of non-audit fees is associated with the
likelihood of impairment. An insignificant coefficient on the variables of interest would suggest
a lack of association between non-audit fees and the probability of a goodwill impairment. A
negative and significant coefficient would indicate that higher levels of non-audit fees are
associated with a reduced likelihood of receiving a goodwill impairment, while a positive and
significant coefficient would suggest that the additional exposure garnered through non-audit

13

services is actually associated with an increase in the likelihood that an auditor requires a
goodwill impairment.
Several control variables from prior literature are also included in this multivariate
analysis. I include LN_AUDITFEES to control for the level of audit fees paid by the client (Blay
and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009). LN_MKVALT is the
natural log of the company’s market value of equity and is included to control for client size.
Following Beatty and Weber (2006), I include the percentage that a company’s market value of
assets is below book value of assets (IMP_PCT) to control for market perceptions of a client’s
valuation. In addition to these current period market valuation factors, I also control for the
company’s market return over the current year (ANN_RETURN) and the standard deviation of
that return (STDEV). GDWL_PCT is the pre-impairment percentage of a firm’s assets that are
composed of goodwill (Ramanna and Watts 2012). LEVERAGE is the ratio of total short- and
long-term interest bearing debt to pre-impairment company book value. To control for the fact
the goodwill impairments occur on a segment-by-segment basis, and the related change in
potential impairment that occurs with an increasing number of segments, I also control for the
natural log of the total number of operating segments of the firm (Francis and Yu 2009).10
Several other firm performance characteristics are also included. LOSS is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if the firm incurred a pre-impairment loss for the fiscal year ended (Hayn and
Hughes 2006). ROA is the company’s pre-impairment net income divided by the average total
assets for the year (Gu and Lev 2011). EBITDA_CHANGE is the change in a company’s
EBITDA from time t-1 to time t divided by the total firm market value of equity. GW_ACQ is an

10

Because goodwill is tested on a segment-by-by-segment basis, multiple segments within a firm could add noise to
the model. To eliminate this noise, I reperform analyses on the 2,051 observations with only one reporting segment.
Results remain unchanged.
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indicator variable included for observations in which the company performed an acquisition that
increased goodwill during the current year ended (AbuGhazaleh et al. 2011). Furthermore, I
control for the type of auditor engaged by the firm as those that employ a Big N auditor (BIGN)
may receive audits of a higher quality and are subsequently more likely to properly impair
goodwill. In addition to these company specific controls, I also control for any industry
(IND_FE) or year (YEAR_FE) specific characteristics. Industries are classified using two-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the
company level.

3.2 Sample Selection
Table 1 presents the sample construction. I first obtain financial data from Compustat for
all companies with fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2003 and ending by May 31, 2012
(Compustat fiscal years 2004 through 2011). Although SFAS 142 went into effect for fiscal
years beginning on or after December 15, 2001, the later beginning date allows for testing
relations after a ‘settling in’ of the significant regulatory changes implemented during the early
part of the decade.11 The amount of audit fees and the amount of non-audit fees are variables
obtained from Audit Analytics, while stock returns data is collected from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP). To limit situations in which the impairment decision is likely
inconsequential or does not involve auditor scrutiny, only firms with material (larger than 0.5
percent of revenues) amounts of pre-impairment goodwill are retained within the sample.
Additionally, the sample is limited to companies with a market value that is materially less than

11
To test the sensitivity of results to this time period cutoff, I reperform analyses using all observations since the
implementation of SFAS 142. Results remain unchanged.
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book value (a market-to-book ratio materially less than one).12 This constraint further limits the
sample to instances where the market has indicated some type of impairment is likely warranted
(Beatty and Weber 2006; Churyk 2005; Harrington et al. 2012), a setting more proper for testing
auditor independence. To be included in the analysis, the observations must contain all requisite
financial data from Compustat, all fee related data from Audit Analytics, and stock return data
from CRSP.
<Insert Table 1 Here>

12

I require that market value that is materially less than book value to ensure a company has the ability to record a
material goodwill impairment without having to surpass a market-to-book ratio equal to one. To ensure results are
not sensitive to this cutoff, I reperform analyses on a sample that includes the 82 observations that have a market-toboo ratio less than, but not materially less than, one and find results that are unchanged.
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IV. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 3,615 firmyear observations. Approximately 35 percent of the companies in the sample have a material
impairment. On average, companies in the sample pay non-audit fees of $477,000 to their current
auditor.13 These same companies also pay an average of $2,078,000 in audit fees annually for an
average of approximately $2.56 million in total fees annually. From an audit related perspective,
about 56 percent of the companies in the sample have a Big N auditor. As expected from the
sample construction, companies have an average market value of assets that is 13 percent less
than book value of assets (IMP_PCT).14 On average, companies in the sample exhibit a negative
change in earnings as well as a negative return on assets.15
<Insert Table 2 Here>
Panel B of Table 2 presents a comparison of means between the subsample of companies
having a goodwill impairment and the subsample of companies that did not have a goodwill
impairment. The first two columns present the observation counts and variable means for the
impairment sample. The third and forth columns present the observation counts and variable
means for the non-impairment sample. From a descriptive standpoint, there is no statistical
difference between the two subsamples in terms of non-audit fees, audit fees, or total fees. Stock
13

422 observations have zero fees for non-audit services. To test the sensitivity of my results to these observations, I
reperform analyses excluding these observations and find that results remain unchanged.
14
Some control variables (e.g. ANN_RETURN having a mean value of negative 27.9 percent and a median value of
negative 35.5 percent) may seem somewhat abnormal in their magnitude, however similar to the market value of
assets to book value of assets variable, these values are reasonable based on the sample construction threshold that
requires observations to have a market-to-book less than one.
15
Descriptive statistics and other results are presented unwinsorized throughout. To test the sensitivity of this
decision, I also reperform all analyses with all continuous control variables winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Results remain similar throughout.
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returns are lower and the standard deviation of those returns is higher for the subsample of
companies that had an impairment. Companies within the impairment subsample are smaller in
size. Furthermore, the two subsamples are similar in terms of number of business segments.16

4.2 Multivariate Analysis
Table 3 presents the results of the estimations of model (1). This table employs IMP as
the dependent variable and is the main test for H1. The negative and significant coefficient on
LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.01) indicates that non-audit fees are inversely related to a company’s
likelihood of receiving a goodwill impairment. In contrast to the finding for non-audit fees, there
is a positive and significant relation between audit fees and goodwill impairments (p < 0.01).
This result is similar to the findings of Jarva (2012), who finds that companies that write-off
goodwill pay higher audit fees.17 These results indicate that the null hypothesis presented in H1
can be rejected.
<Insert Table 3 Here>
The coefficients on the control variables generally load as expected and are consistent
with prior research. The positive and significant coefficient on BIGN indicates that companies
with a Big N auditor are more likely to impair goodwill than those without a Big N auditor.

16

The difference in some characteristics between the two subsamples suggests that any results could potentially be
driven by differences in observable characteristics between the groups. I employ a propensity score matching
technique that matches all goodwill impairment companies with the most similar company that did not receive a
goodwill impairment to help alleviate any concerns that these differences may be driving results. See robustness for
further discussion.
17
Although the opposing findings for non-audit fees and audit fees may at first seem contradictory, these results are
consistent with traditional investor fee arguments noted by the AICPA (2004) and the findings of Higgs and Skantz
(2006) which, taken together, suggest that investors value high audit fees because they are related to either (1) an
audit of a higher quality or (2) an audit that requires more work, and are concerned with non-audit fees because the
related additional work is seen as very profitable for the auditor, making it a highly desirable annuity. In this way, a
“dollar is not necessarily a dollar” given the source it is derived from may differ significantly in profitability. The
results of these analyses are consistent with each of these fee contentions.
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Other control variables generally follow expectations and prior literature. As suggested by Beatty
and Weber (2006), there is a positive relation between how far the market value of assets is
below book value of assets (IMP_PCT) and the likelihood of impairment. The likelihood of
impairment also increases for companies with a loss (Hayn and Hughes 2006), for companies
with a larger standard deviation of stock price over the preceding year (Beatty and Weber 2006),
for more highly levered companies, and companies with a higher percentage of their total assets
represented by goodwill. Consistent with Gu and Lev (2011), the likelihood of impairment
appears to decrease as ROA increases. Interestingly, and somewhat in contrast to expectations,
the findings indicate that companies with an increase in earnings are more likely to impair. This
result could be due to a higher willingness to impair for those companies that have experienced
other positive news.
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V. CONSIDERATIONS OF PRIOR SAMPLE LIMITATIONS
A primary assertion of this study is that prior research employing going concerns has
potentially suffered from sample limitations that may affect the ability to draw inferences. To
test the validity of this assertion, I use goodwill impairments to assess the potential impact that
these sample limitations may have had on prior research’s ability to document any effects of
non-audit fees on auditor independence. Specifically, I employ the goodwill impairment setting
and separately evaluate 1) the effects of limited power, 2) the potential of bias due to concerns
over future viability, and 3) the potential of bias due to litigation risk.18

5.1 Potential Limitation from Sample Power
Tests employing going concerns are generally limited to between 100 and 180 first-time
going concern opinions, along with another 1,000 to 1,500 “distressed” counterfactuals (Blay
and Geiger 2013; DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger and Rama 2003; Li 2009). The small number of
going concerns may limit the ability to detect an association with non-audit fees. To construct a
sample of goodwill impairments that is similar in power, I use the 1,270 observations that
recorded a goodwill impairment and randomly group them into deciles of 127 observations. I
then use the 1,172 non-impairment observations below the median market value of assets to
book value of assets to construct a counterfactual sample of those firms that were “most likely”
in need of an impairment to their goodwill. I then perform estimations of model (1) on ten
subsamples, each one consisting of one of the randomly generated deciles and the counterfactual

18

Because there is no way to capture the effect size of going concerns used in prior research and compare it to the
effect size of goodwill impairments in this setting, the ability to draw inferences from this section is limited by the
extent that the effect sizes differ. Additionally, while different proxies are used to examine each potential bias
individually, I cannot completely rule out the possibility that these proxies are capturing the effect of more than one
of the potential biases examined.
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group.19 The results from these regressions are presented in Table 4. As shown, the significant
reduction in power of the impairment group had a substantial effect on the inferences that can be
drawn. More specifically, only two of the ten subsamples have a significant coefficient (p < 0.05
and p < 0.10). These findings suggest that the lack of power found in the previous non-audit fees
literature could be playing a significant role in the ability of researchers to document a negative
association between non-audit fees and auditor independence.
<Insert Table 4 Here>

5.2 Potential Limitations from Sample Bias
5.2.1 Bias from Concerns of Future Viability
To consider the possibility that auditors may just be particularly unwilling to weaken
their independence for those companies they believe have no long-term viability, I reperform
earlier analyses and include an indicator variable capturing whether or not the auditor issued a
going concern (GC). I use the going concern variable as it provides the most direct and
observable insight into auditor’s beliefs about a company’s future viability. I also include an
interaction between GC and LN_NONAUDIT. Results from this analysis are presented in Table
5. As shown, there is a negative and significant coefficient on the standalone variable
LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.01). This indicates a strong result for those clients not receiving a going
concern modification. The insignificant linear combination suggests that there is no such relation
with non-audit fees for those companies that do receive a going concern. Furthermore, the
coefficient on this linear combination is positive, suggesting these observations are not close to

19

Although industry fixed effects are included in all other analyses, I omit them from these smaller sample size
regressions. This limits the loss of data caused by a lack of variation in the dependent variable within each industry
(variation is required for estimation of a logit model). Results are similar to those presented if industry fixed effects
are included.
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being negative and significant like their counterparts that received a clean opinion. It is also
noteworthy that the interaction variable, which tests the difference between the two subsamples,
is both positive and approaching significance (p = 0.14 two-tail). Although the presence of going
concern modifications is small (just over four percent of the sample received one), these results
provide some evidence that auditors may not weaken independence for those clients that they
believe to have the most questionable future viability.
<Insert Table 5 Here>

5.2.2 Bias from the Risk of Litigation
An additional source of potential bias is the possibility that auditors are less willing to
impair their independence when the circumstances involve a higher risk of litigation. To examine
this possibility, I reperform earlier analyses and include a dichotomous variable indicating
whether or not the company belonged to an industry with high litigation risk (LITIGATION). I
follow Francis et al. (1994) to determine those industries that are highly litigious.20,21 Similar to
the previous analysis considering sample bias from future viability, LITIGATION is also
interacted with LN_NONAUDIT. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 6. The
negative and significant coefficient on the standalone variable of interest LN_NONAUDIT (p <
0.01), indicates a strong negative relation between non-audit fees and goodwill impairment for
those clients in non-litigious industries. The insignificant linear combination suggests that those
companies that are in a litigious industry do not exhibit this same relation. Furthermore, the
interaction between the litigation indicator and non-audit fees, which tests the difference between

20

Industries considered highly litigious are: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC
codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), or retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961).
21
Because a going concern modification can also be considered a sign of litigation risk, I reperform the analyses in
this section by considering litigation risk as any company that either has received a going concern modification or is
in a litigious industry as risky. Results from analyses using this specification remain unchanged.
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the two subsamples is positive and significant (p < 0.05). This result provides some evidence that
auditors are less likely to reduce their independence for those clients that they believe are a
higher litigation risk.
<Insert Table 6 Here>
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VI. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS
6.1 Non-Audit Fees and the Amount of Impairment
One limitation when testing the relation between non-audit fees and auditor independence
with going concern modifications is that a going concern opinion is dichotomous in nature. In
addition to the ability to similarly test an effect on likelihood, however, goodwill impairments
also offer an opportunity to assess magnitude effects as the impairment amount can range
anywhere between zero and the full amount of goodwill on the books. If non-audit fees impair
independence, as suggested by the results of the main analysis, clients paying higher amounts of
those types of fees may also impair an amount lower than they would in a completely
independent situation. The dependent variable is IMP_AMT, which is a continuous variable equal
to the amount of a company’s goodwill impairment scaled by its pre-impairment total goodwill
(a measure obtained from Beatty and Weber (2006)). Because the amount of impairment is often
zero, or non-impairment, I use a tobit regression model to perform this analysis. All control
variables are the same as those used in the main analysis. A negative and significant coefficient
on the variables of interest (LN_NONAUDIT) would provide evidence that higher non-audit fees
are associated with a lower amount of impairment.
<Insert Table 7 Here>
Table 7 presents the results of the estimations of the tobit model. The negative and
significant coefficient on LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.01) suggests that the amount of impairment
declines as the level of non-audit fees rises. This result indicates an inverse relation between the
level of non-audit fees and the amount of goodwill impairment and provides additional support
for the findings in the main analysis.
24

6.2 Non-Audit Fees and the Time Until Impairment
In addition to demonstrating likelihood and amount characteristics, Hayn and Hughes
(2006) find that goodwill impairments are also subject to timing decisions by companies. This
timing aspect introduces an additional avenue for testing the impact of non-audit fees on
goodwill impairment decisions. Auditors that are fully independent should, on average, require
that their clients impair goodwill at the proper time. If non-audit fees have a negative impact on
auditor independence, however, the length of time it takes to actually record an impairment
would be longer. I further analyze the potential impact of non-audit fees on goodwill impairment
decisions by using duration, or survival, analysis to examine the length of time before a write-off
occurs.22,23 The variable of interest in this analysis remain the same as in tests of H1, although
the direction of the coefficient has the opposite meaning. A positive and significant coefficient
on the variable LN_NONAUDIT would provide evidence that higher levels of non-audit fees are
associated with a longer lag in time until impairment and would provide evidence of a negative
effect of non-audit fees on properly impairing goodwill. For this analysis, a company joins the
analysis the first-time its market-to-book ratio falls below one and remains in the sample until its
market-to-book is no longer less than one or impairment occurs.24 Observations that occur after a
company initially exits the sample, either through an improvement in market-to-book ratio or by

22

See Beatty et al. (2002), Gurley-Calvez and Bruce (2008), and Tse and Tucker (2010) for examples of this type of
analysis in accounting literature.
23
Duration analysis estimates the probability that a firm impairs its goodwill given that it remains in the sample and
has not previously recorded a goodwill impairment during its tenure in the sample. In this setting, tests of the data
suggest that the appropriate duration model is a parametric model (i.e. changes in covariates affect the time until an
event) with a log-logistic functional form.
24
When testing duration, it is important to ensure observations are measured from the first point they are subject to
treatment. The concern is that any “left-censoring” in the data could bias the results of the duration analysis.
Because there is available data since the point SFAS 142 went into effect (for fiscal years beginning on or after
December 15, 2001), I can be certain that I observe the first date each company enters the sample threshold.
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recording some impairment, are not included. Control variables remain the same as those
included in model (1).
<Insert Table 8 Here>
Table 8 presents the results of the duration analysis. The positive and significant
coefficient on LN_NONAUDIT (p < 0.10) indicates that a higher level of non-audit fees is
associated with a longer period of time until a company actually records a goodwill impairment.
This result suggests that higher levels of non-audit fees are associated with clients that take
longer to impair goodwill, again providing further support for the earlier findings.

6.3 Goodwill Impairment Accuracy and Non-Audit Fees
Although valuation services are specifically prohibited under current auditor
independence standards, it could be argued that the expanded relationship created by a higher
level of non-audit service work may actually have some spillover effects and improve an
auditor’s understanding of a client’s goodwill environment (Simunic 1984). If this is the case, an
improved understanding should result in the auditor making a more accurate assessment of
goodwill and therefore making a better impairment decision. To consider the possibility that nonaudit fees actually improve goodwill impairment accuracy, I employ the residuals obtained from
running model (1) and determine the absolute value of the difference between actual impairment
outcome – the zero or one dichotomous variable – and the predicted probability from the logit
regression. To test the relation between non-audit fees and this absolute error, I dichotomize nonaudit fees at the median and perform a univariate comparison of the absolute error between the
subsample of companies with non-audit fees above the median and those with non-audit fees
below the median. In untabulated results, I find that the average absolute error for the 1,807
26

companies with non-audit fees below the median is significantly less than the average error for
the 1,808 companies with non-audit fees above the median (p < 0.10).25 These result suggests
that goodwill impairment accuracy is actually worse for those companies that have a higher level
of non-audit fees, helping to rule out the possibility that the observed negative relation between
non-audit fees and goodwill impairments is actually the result of non-audit services improving
impairment accuracy.

6.4 Client Importance and the Effect of Non-Audit Fees
Earlier analyses document an average negative effect of non-audit fees on auditor
independence. It is possible, however, that the reduction in independence only occurs for those
clients that are most important to the auditor. I explore this possibility by considering two
proxies for client importance. First, I compare the effects of non-audit fees for those companies
above the median market value of equity for the sample to those below the median. Second, I
compare the effects of non-audit fees for those clients above the median level of office influence,
defined as total company fees as a percentage of total office fees, to those below the median level
of office influence.26 I expect that non-audit fees for those companies that are larger and/or more
influential to their respective audit office to have the most impact on reducing auditor
independence. Consistent with this expectation, untabulated results from each of these analyses
exhibit negative and significant interaction between LN_NONAUDIT and the measure of client
importance (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively). Further, the significant negative linear
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To further test accuracy, I develop a prediction model using an ‘out-of-sample’ testing technique to ensure that
absolute error is not mechanically related to the prediction itself. This technique is implemented by running equation
(1) on a randomly drawn quarter of the original sample, and then using the predictions obtained from this regression
to compute the absolute impairment errors for the remaining 75 percent of the sample. Results from this technique
continue to show that companies with non-audit fees above the median have a statistically worse accuracy than those
below the median (p < 0.05).
26
Because total office fees also include the non-audit fees considered throughout this paper, I also reperform
analyses after calculating office influence based only on audit fees. Results are unchanged.
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combinations in each regression (both p < 0.01) indicate that the negative effect for important
clients alone is significantly different than zero, while the coefficients on LN_NONAUDIT
suggest no negative effects for those clients that could be considered less important. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the most important clients may be driving the negative
effects that non-audit fees have on auditor independence.

6.5 Additional Robustness
6.5.1Propensity Score Matching
Several papers have noted that functional form misspecification (non-linearity) between
the dependent variable, the independent variable of interest, and/or the control variables can
cause potential bias in the estimated coefficients (Armstrong et al. 2012; Lawrence et al. 2011).
These studies use a propensity score matching process introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) to adjust for any functional form misspecification that may be present. Following these
studies, I also perform the estimations of model (1) on a propensity score matched subsample.27
The matching process uses a logit model to develop scores measuring the ‘propensity’ of a
company for having an impairment based on the observable client characteristics, other than the
variable of interest.28 This matching allows comparison of a sample of companies that have a
goodwill impairment to companies that do not have a goodwill impairment but are similar in all
other observable characteristics. Untabulated results from analyses using the propensity-matched
27
I employ the propensity matching procedure in a manner similar to Francis et al. (2012), where the dependent
variable in the match is the same as the dependent variable in the main model. This process ensures that companies
in the matched subsamples are similar on all observable characteristics, while still allowing for variation in the
variable of interest (LN_NONAUDIT). Matching occurs without replacement and within a maximum caliper distance
of three percent.
28
Because the matching process allows for companies to be matched based on observable characteristics, all
companies with a material level of goodwill, not just those with a market-to-book less than one, could be used as a
starting point for the propensity score match. When all companies with material goodwill are used in the matching
process, inferences remain unchanged.
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samples remain highly significant, further suggesting that non-audit fees have a negative relation
with the likelihood of having a material goodwill impairment. These findings suggest that the
initial results regarding the relation between non-audit fees and goodwill impairments are likely
not the product of functional form misspecification due to differences in observable
characteristics between the subsamples of companies that impair and those that do not.

6.5.2 Materiality of Impairment
Throughout this study, I define IMP as a material impairment in order to reduce potential
statistical noise that may be introduced by immaterial goodwill write-offs. To ensure that my
results are not influenced by this decision, I perform two additional analyses. First, I eliminate
the materiality requirement and include all impairments. Second, I exclude the observations with
an immaterial impairment completely and analyze only those observations with a material
impairment or no impairment. In untabulated tests, I find that both results remain unchanged
from earlier findings. This indicates that the results do not appear to be driven by the decision to
examine material goodwill impairments.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This study employs goodwill impairments to examine auditor independence. More
specifically, goodwill impairments are used to measure the effects of non-audit fees on an
auditor’s independence from a client. Prior studies in this area have potentially suffered from
research limitations and goodwill impairments offer several benefits to address these limitations.
Capital markets can be used to create an appropriate sample of companies with a high probability
of having their goodwill impaired, establishing an appropriate counterfactual sample.
Furthermore, goodwill impairments are not nearly as limited in the number of occurrences (lack
of power) or in the types of companies potentially affected (sample bias). In addition to
addressing these limitations, goodwill impairments also provide an interesting setting as they
offer the potential to assess how non-audit fees affect magnitude and timing decisions.
Using a sample of companies with material goodwill and a market-indicated impairment,
I examine whether non-audit fees play a statistically significant role in the likelihood that a
goodwill impairment is recorded. If auditors are behaving less independently, it will result in a
significant lowering of the likelihood that a company receives a goodwill impairment. Consistent
with this possibility, results indicate a negative relation between non-audit fees and the
likelihood of receiving a goodwill impairment. Additional tests suggest that higher levels of nonaudit fees are also associated with lower impairment amounts and a longer time lag until
impairment occurs. Taken together, the results of these analyses suggest that clients that pay
higher amounts of non-audit fees may be receiving preferential treatment regarding the
impairment of their goodwill. Further, analyses suggest that the lack of results in prior non-audit
fees literature may be due to the aforementioned sample limitations (i.e. lack of power and/or
sample bias).
30

The results of this paper provide valuable insights to regulators and investors in a setting
other than going concern modifications and help to reconcile the seemingly arbitrary concerns
continually expressed by regulators and investors about potential negative consequences of nonaudit service fees with the lack of results documented in prior research. These findings suggest
that the understanding of the relation between non-audit fees and auditor independence may be
less complete than previously thought and indicate a need for continued research into this area.
It is important to note that this research is subject to potential limitations. As with most
research, any inferences from this study are subject to the ability of recording a goodwill
impairment to capture the construct of auditor independence. Additionally, it is important that
caution be taken when inferring causality. Any causal results are limited by each model’s ability
to properly capture those effects.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1: Sample Selection
Table 1 outlines the selection process for both the full sample used in the likelihood and amount analyses and the
reduced sampled employed in the duration analysis.

Observations
with required
data

Sample for Likelihood and Amount Analyses:
Number of observations with all required Compustat data (fiscal years 2004 through 2011)
Less:
Observations without necessary stock price information in CRSP
Observations without necessary fee data in Audit Analytics
Observations without a material level of goodwill
Observations without a market value that is less than book value
Observations without a market value that is materially less than book value
Observations within industries that have no variation in impairment outcome
(variation is necessary to perform logit model analysis)
Total observations meeting full sample criteria

32,399

(5,161)
(4,477)
(906)
(18,150)
(82)
(8)
3,615

Sample for Duration Analyses:
Total observations meeting full sample criteria (from above)
Less:
Observations that occur after a company first exits the sample (i.e., either impairs
goodwill or market-to-book improves)
Total observations meeting duration analysis criteria

3,615

(1,212)
2,410
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 3,615 firm-year observations. Panel B of
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the two subsamples of interest: IMP=0 (no material goodwill
impairment present) and IMP=1 (material goodwill impairment present). The last column of Panel B presents the
two-tailed t-statistics of the difference between the two subsamples. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).

Panel A: Full Sample
Variable
IMP
NONAUDIT_FEES
AUDIT_FEES
TOTAL_FEES
BIGN
MKVALT
IMP_PCT
GDWL_PCT
LOSS
LEVERAGE
ROA
GW_ACQ
EBITDA_CHANGE
SEGMENTS
ANN_RETURN
STDEV

N
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615
3,615

Mean
0.351
0.477
2.078
2.556
0.559
1,235.075
0.130
0.153
0.399
1.136
-0.020
0.472
-13.787
2.249
-0.279
0.167

Standard
Deviation
0.477
2.412
7.072
9.155
0.497
7,069.408
0.133
0.181
0.490
2.719
0.194
0.499
630.090
1.738
0.829
0.485

p(25)
0.000
0.020
0.258
0.323
0.000
31.500
0.032
0.020
0.000
0.169
-0.029
0.000
-0.163
1.000
-0.606
0.094

Median
0.000
0.076
0.679
0.773
1.000
99.008
0.077
0.074
0.000
0.557
0.005
0.000
-0.020
1.000
-0.355
0.139

p(75)
1.000
0.234
1.600
1.898
1.000
392.280
0.192
0.236
1.000
1.280
0.035
1.000
0.046
3.000
-0.072
0.199

Panel B: Comparison of Impairment and Non-Impairment Companies
IMP = 0
IMP = 1
Variable
N
Mean
N
Mean
NONAUDIT_FEES
2,345
0.495
1,270
0.444
AUDIT_FEES
2,345
2.049
1,270
2.133
TOTAL_FEES
2,345
2.543
1,270
2.578
BIGN
2,345
0.527
1,270
0.617
MKVALT
2,345
1,425.329
1,270
883.780
IMP_PCT
2,345
0.099
1,270
0.188
GDWL_PCT
2,345
0.120
1,270
0.215
LOSS
2,345
0.273
1,270
0.631
LEVERAGE
2,345
1.085
1,270
1.230
ROA
2,345
0.008
1,270
-0.071
GW_ACQ
2,345
0.449
1,270
0.513
EBITDA_CHANGE
2,345
-21.053
1,270
-0.372
SEGMENTS
2,345
2.233
1,270
2.279
ANN_RETURN
2,345
-0.184
1,270
-0.455
STDEV
2,345
0.140
1,270
0.215

Difference
0.051
(0.084)
(0.035)
(0.090)
541.549
(0.089)
(0.095)
(0.358)
(0.145)
0.079
(0.064)
(20.681)
(0.046)
0.271
(0.075)

t-statistic
0.656
-0.336
-0.108
-5.301
2.459
-18.503
18.323
-21.818
-1.342
9.501
-3.700
-1.280
-0.754
7.785
-3.284
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***
**
***
***
***
***
***

***
***

Table 3: Impairment Likelihood Analysis
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of model (1) on the full sample of observations having a market-tobook less than one. The dependent variable is IMP. The variable of interest is the natural log of non-audit fees
(LN_NONAUDIT). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Industry and year specific intercepts are not included
for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).

VARIABLES
LN_NONAUDIT
LN_AUDITFEES
BIGN
LN_MKVALT
IMP_PCT
GDWL_PCT
LOSS
LEVERAGE
ROA
GW_ACQ
EBITDA_CHANGE
LN_SEGMENTS
ANN_RETURN
STDEV

Industry and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Pseudo R-squared

(1)
IMP
-0.544***
(-2.910)
0.849***
(4.614)
0.365***
(2.963)
-0.0745
(-1.297)
4.033***
(7.957)
2.768***
(7.934)
1.107***
(8.370)
0.0469*
(1.861)
-1.483**
(-2.499)
0.179**
(1.978)
0.001***
(2.680)
0.0475
(0.617)
-0.254
(-0.604)
1.726***
(2.630)
Included
3,615
0.254
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Table 4: Limited Sample Power Analysis
Table 4 presents the results of the limited sample power analysis. The dependent variable in each logit regression is
IMP. The natural log of non-audit fees is the variable of interest in all regressions. All variables are defined in
Appendix 1. Year specific intercepts are not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).

(1)
IMP

(2)
IMP

(3)
IMP

(4)
IMP

(5)
IMP

-0.179
(-0.463)
0.0944
(0.308)

-0.225
(-0.519)
-0.188
(-0.558)

-0.158
(-0.435)
0.259
(0.836)

-0.369
(-0.899)
0.179
(0.553)

-0.241
(-0.733)
0.0852
(0.282)

Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Included

Observations

1,299

1,299

1,299

1,299

1,299

VARIABLES

(6)
IMP

(7)
IMP

(8)
IMP

(9)
IMP

(10)
IMP

-0.943**
(-2.237)
0.336
(1.016)

-0.221
(-0.573)
0.107
(0.323)

-0.329
(-0.912)
0.264
(0.827)

-0.732*
(-1.723)
0.377
(1.155)

-0.746
(-1.565)
-0.264
(-0.811)

Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Included

Included
Included

1,299

1,299

1,299

1,299

1,299

VARIABLES
LN_NONAUDIT
LN_FEES

Additional Controls
Year Fixed Effects

LN_NONAUDIT
LN_FEES

Additional Controls
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
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Table 5: Analysis of Potential of Sample Bias (Subsequent Viability)
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis examining the potential of sample bias due to auditor concerns of
subsequent viability. Subsequent viability is proxied for by including an indicator for those clients that received a
going concern modification (GC). The dependent variable in this logit regression is IMP. All variables are defined in
Appendix 1. Industry and year specific intercepts are not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics
are presented in parentheses in column 2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively (based on two-tailed tests).

VARIABLES
LN_NONAUDIT
LN_NAS_x_GC
GC
LN_FEES
BIGN
LN_MKVALT
MAT_IMPAIR_PERCENT
GDWL_PCT
LOSS
LEVERAGE
ROA
GW_ACQ
EBITDA_CHANGE
LN_SEGMENTS
ANN_RETURN
STDEV

(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Z-statistic

(3)
Significance

-0.557
2.161
0.045
0.837
0.359
-0.069
4.063
2.756
1.100
0.045
-1.467
0.179
0.001
0.050
-0.236
1.624

(-2.996)
(1.458)
(0.155)
(4.655)
(2.911)
(-1.227)
(7.981)
(7.900)
(8.353)
(1.879)
(-2.508)
(1.977)
(2.660)
(0.652)
(-0.573)
(2.495)

***

Industry and Year Fixed Effects

***
***
***
*
**
**
***

**

Included

Observations
Linear Combinations
LN_NONAUDIT + LN_NAS_x_GC

***
***

3,615

1.6034

1.08
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Table 6: Analysis of Potential of Sample Bias (Litigation Risk)
Table 6 presents the results of the analyses examining the potential of sample bias due to auditor concerns of
litigation risk. Litigation risk is proxied for by including an indicator for those clients that are in a litigious industry
(LITIGATION). The dependent variable in this logit regression is IMP. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Year specific intercepts are not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in
parentheses in column 2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based
on two-tailed tests).

VARIABLES
LN_NONAUDIT
LN_NAS_x_LITIGATION
LITIGATION
LN_FEES
BIGN
LN_MKVALT
MAT_IMPAIR_PERCENT
GDWL_PCT
LOSS
LEVERAGE
ROA
GW_ACQ
EBITDA_CHANGE
LN_SEGMENTS
ANN_RETURN
STDEV

(1)
Coefficient

(2)
Z-statistic

(3)
Significance

-0.453
0.671
-0.198
0.546
0.243
0.014
3.604
1.870
1.115
0.070
-1.179
0.149
0.001
-0.109
-0.381
1.890

(-2.584)
(2.119)
(-1.490)
(3.689)
(2.104)
(0.285)
(7.787)
(7.310)
(8.807)
(1.627)
(-2.167)
(1.690)
(2.044)
(-1.617)
(-0.784)
(3.116)

***
**

Industry and Year Fixed Effects

***
***
***
**
*
**

***

Included

Observations
Linear Combinations
LN_NAS + LN_NAS_x_LITIGATION

***
**

3,615

0.2177

0.69
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Table 7: Impairment Amount Analysis
Table 7 presents the results of the tobit analysis on the full sample of observations. The dependent variable is the
continuous variable IMP_AMT. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Industry and year specific intercepts are
not included for brevity. Cluster (company) robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).

VARIABLES
LN_NONAUDIT
LN_AUDITFEES
BIGN
LN_MKVALT
IMP_PCT
GDWL_PCT
LOSS
LEVERAGE
ROA
GW_ACQ
EBITDA_CHANGE
LN_SEGMENTS
ANN_RETURN
STDEV

Industry and Year Fixed Effects
Observations

(1)
IMP_AMT
-0.184***
(-3.426)
0.279***
(6.281)
0.153***
(4.356)
-0.0491***
(-3.750)
1.315***
(10.91)
0.364***
(4.184)
0.468***
(14.17)
0.0159***
(3.184)
-0.217*
(-1.937)
0.0409
(1.523)
0.000422***
(4.245)
-0.0329
(-1.492)
-0.0401
(-1.072)
-0.0555
(-1.608)
Included
3,615
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Table 8: Impairment Timing Analysis
Table 8 presents the results of the duration analysis. The dependent variable is time until failure (when IMP = 1)
occurs. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Industry and year specific intercepts are not included for brevity.
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on two-tailed tests).

VARIABLES
LN_NONAUDIT
LN_AUDITFEES
BIGN
LN_MKVALT
IMP_PCT
GDWL_PCT
LOSS
LEVERAGE
ROA
GW_ACQ
EBITDA_CHANGE
LN_SEGMENTS
ANN_RETURN
STDEV

Industry and Year Fixed Effects
Number of Subjects (Companies)
Number of Failures (Impairments)
Analysis Time (Years)

(1)
TIME
0.0798*
(1.917)
-0.0773**
(-2.250)
0.00206
(0.0640)
-0.0505***
(-4.604)
-0.00127
(-0.0126)
-0.211***
(-2.974)
-0.146***
(-4.797)
0.00271
(0.680)
-0.0210
(-0.343)
-0.0819***
(-3.423)
-0.000149**
(-2.440)
-0.00360
(-0.190)
0.832***
(12.32)
-0.0149
(-0.861)
Included
1,580
871
2,410
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Appendix B: Variable Descriptions
Variable
ANN_RETURN
AUDIT_FEES
BIGN
EBITDA_CHANGE
GC
GDWL_PCT
GW_ACQ
IMP

IMP_AMT
IMP_PCT
IND_FE
LITIGATION

LEVERAGE
LN_AUDITFEES
LN_MKVALT
LN_NONAUDIT
LN_SEGMENTS
LN_TOTALFEES
LOSS
MKTBOOK
MKVALT
NONAUDIT_FEES
ROA
SEGMENTS
STDEV
TIME
TOTAL_FEES
YEAR_FE

Variable Definition
Company’s buy and hold stock return over the current year.
Sum of audit fees (in millions) paid to current fiscal year auditor.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by a Big N firm, 0
otherwise.
Change in a company’s EBITDA from prior period scaled by its market
value of equity.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s auditor included a going
concern modification as part of the auditor’s report, 0 otherwise.
Pre-impairment percentage of a company’s assets that is composed of
goodwill.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company performed an acquisition that
increased goodwill during the current year, 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company recorded a material goodwill
impairment during the fiscal year (defined as a goodwill impairment
greater than 0.5 percent of revenues), 0 otherwise.
Continuous variable equal to the amount of a company’s goodwill
impairment divided by its pre-impairment total goodwill.
Percentage that a company’s market value of assets is below book value of
assets.
Indicator variables for each two-digit SIC classification.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if a company’s industry is biotechnology (SIC
codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and
7370-7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), or retailing (SIC codes
5200-5961), 0 otherwise.
Total short- and long-term interest bearing debt divided by pre-impairment
book value of equity.
Natural log of the sum of audit fees paid to current fiscal year auditor.
Natural log of the company’s market value of equity.
Natural log of the sum of non-audit fees paid to current fiscal year auditor.
Natural log of the company’s number of segments.
Natural log of the sum of total fees paid to current fiscal year auditor.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company suffered a pre-impairment loss
for the fiscal year ended, 0 otherwise.
Ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets.
Company’s market value of equity (in millions).
Sum of non-audit fees (in millions) paid to current fiscal year auditor.
Pre-impairment net income divided by average total assets for the year.
Company’s number of segments.
Standard deviation of a company’s stock returns over the current year.
Number of consecutive years that a company’s market-to-book ratio is less
than one and the company does not record a material goodwill impairment.
Sum of all fees (in millions) paid to current fiscal year auditor.
Indicator variables for each fiscal year.
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